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TOWARDS DEFINING THE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP
EXCEPTION TO CERCLA'S THIRD-PARTY DEFENSE:
WESTWOOD PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. V
NATIONAL FUEL GAS DISTRIBUTION CORP.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its enactment in 1980, the Comprehensive Environmen-
tal Response Compensation, and Liability Act of 19801 (CERCLA)
has served as EPA's primary weapon to clean up hazardous waste
sites. CERCLA is an effective enforcement mechanism because of
the broad authority it grants EPA to exact cleanup costs from "po-
tentially responsible parties" ("PRPs").2
CERCLA derives its enormous power to impose liability from
the statute itself and also from the way the courts have applied the
statute. While the language of CERCLA targets an extremely broad
group of PRPs liable for cleanup,3 the courts have interpreted the
statute to impose strict liability on PRPs.4 In addition, courts have
imposed joint and several liability.5 However, Congress has author-
ized only three extremely narrow affirmative defenses to defend
against this broad liability scheme. 6
1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and liability Act
of 1980 (CERCLA), §§ 101-308, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
2. A "potentially responsible party" is any party who may potentially fall within
§ 107(a) of CERCLA, which defines the scope of liability under CERCLA. See CER-
CLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). For the text of CERCLA § 107(a), see infra
note 53.
3. See Note, Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARv. L. REv.
1458, 1514-17 (1986) [hereinafter Toxic Waste Litigation]. The text of § 107(a) of
CERCLA is set forth infra note 53. Generally, CERCLA imposes liability on past
and present owners or operators of a facility on which hazardous waste was dis-
posed and generators and transporters of hazardous waste. See CERCLA § 107(a),
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
4. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir.
1985).
6. Section 107(b) sets forth the affirmative defenses as follows:
(B) DEFENSES
There shall be no liability under section (a) of this section for a person
.otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the
damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or
agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in con-
(237)
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A PRP may avoid liability under CERCLA if the PRP can
demonstrate that the release or threat of release of hazardous sub-
stances was caused solely by an act of God, an act of war, or an act of
a third party as specified by the statute.7 As wars and hurricanes
occur relatively infrequently, the typical CERCIA defendant is left
with only the third-party defense to avoid liability.
8
The proposed third-party defense in CERCLA was more broad
than as finally enacted. However, Congress was concerned that
generators would avoid strict liability under CERCLA merely by en-
gaging a third party to dispose of the waste.9 Therefore, Congress
narrowed the available defenses even further by incorporating into
the third-party defense what has become known as the "contractual
nection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly,
with the defendant (except where the sole contractual arrangement
arises from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common
carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
substance concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of
such hazardous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances,
and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any
such third party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from
such acts or omissions; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
CERCLA § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
Although the statute only specifies three defenses, some courts have main-
tained that equitable defenses to CERCIA liability are available. Consider the fol-
lowing summary of the law by one court:
[C]ourts have split as to whether § 107 of CERCLA forecloses common
law equitable defenses .... Several courts have held that because equita-
ble defenses such as waiver, release, laches, and estoppel are not con-
tained in § 107(b), they are not available to defeat CERCLA cost recovery
claims by the United States. Other courts have held that the defenses
listed in § 107(b) do not expressly abrogate a district court's equity juris-
diction and do not foreclose the availability of equitable defenses. Fi-
nally, some courts have recognized that the language of § 107 of CERCLA
may foreclose any equitable defenses but nevertheless have refused to dis-
pose of equitable defenses on a motion to strike.
United States v. Walerko Tool & Eng'g Corp., 784 F. Supp. 1385, 1388 (N.D. Ind.
1992) (citations omitted). See also Westwood Pharmaceuticals v. National Fuel Gas Dis-
tribution Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1272, 1274-75 n.1, 1287 (W.D.N.Y. 1990), affd., 964
F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992) (district court declined to strike equitable defenses main-
tained by defendant).
7. CERCLA § 107(b) (1)-(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1)-(3).
8. The judicial history of the third-party defense does not include a single
case in which the defense was predicated on either an act of war or an act of God.
For a list of cases addressing the third-party defense, see infra notes 75-77.
The defendant can avoid liability by attacking other requirements of the stat-
ute. For instance, the defendant can contest his categorization as a PRP under
CERCLA § 107(a). For an overview of the CERCLA liability scheme, see generally
Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3.
9. For a discussion of the legislative history behind the contractual relation-
ship exception, see infra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
[Vol. V: p. 237
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relationship exception." 10 This exception effectively bars PRPs
from asserting the third-party defense in situations where the PRP
was in a contractual relationship with the third party allegedly re-
sponsible for the "release or threatened release" that triggered
liability.'
The statute, however, does not clearly define the scope of the
defense or the exception. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit narrowed the contractual relationship exception in West-
wood Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp.12
This decision represents the first definitive statement by a federal
circuit court concerning the scope of the contractual relationship
exception to CERCLA's third-party defense.' 3  In Westwood
Pharmaceuticals, the Second Circuit narrowed the contractual rela-
tionship exception by requiring that the contractual relationship
between the defendant and the third party relate to the act or omis-
sion that caused the release or threat of release. 14 The court held
that in order for the contractual relationship to bar the defense, the
contract must either relate to the hazardous substance, or permit
the landowner to exert control over the third party such that the
exercise of due care could have prevented the release.' 5
This Note traces the development of the contractual relation-
ship exception from its conception in Congress to the Second Cir-
cuit's analysis in Westwood Pharmaceuticals. This Note suggests that
while the court reached a result consistent with statutory language
and legislative history, the reasoning in the opinion is flawed be-
cause the court failed to discuss the application of the law to the
facts before the court. This Note also synthesizes the Westwood
Pharmaceuticals decision and prior caselaw to present an updated
assessment of the judiciary's view of the contractual relationship
exception.16
10. See CERCLA § 107(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (3).
11. This represents a rough statement of the effect of the contractual relation-
ship exception. This Note will assess the scope of this exception in greater detail.
The "release or threat of release" language originates in the text of CERCLA
§ 107(b) (3). See supra note 6.
12. 964 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992).
13. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
14. Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 964 F.2d at 91-92. The Second Circuit's holding
narrowed the exception in that the circuit courts that addressed the issue before
this case did not require a nexus between the contract and the act or omission
causing the release.
15. Id. at 91. For the Second Circuit's holding, see infra text accompanying
note 139.
16. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's reasoning and the anticipated
impact of the case, see infra notes 137-70 and accompanying text. For additional
1994]
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II. FACrS
The dispute in Westwood Pharmaceuticals arose from Westwood
Pharmaceutical's (Westwood) 1972 purchase of 8.8 acres of prop-
erty in Buffalo, New York (the site) from Iroquois Gas Corporation
(Iroquois), National Fuel Gas Distribution Corporation's (National
Fuel) predecessor-in-interest. 17 Iroquois purchased the property in
1925 and used it for gas manufacture, storage, and compression
until 1968.18 In 1968, Iroquois demolished several of the structures
located on the northern end of the site that it had used in its gas
operations.' 9
Westwood had occupied the property adjacent to the Iroquois
site since at least 1942.20 In 1972, Westwood agreed to purchase the
site from Iroquois.2' As part of the contract of sale, Westwood was
allowed access to the site prior to final settlement. 22 The contract
also contained representations by Iroquois that all equipment left
on the property had been purged of natural gas and other chemi-
cals used in Iroquois' business.2 3
discussion of the contractual relationship exception to CERCLA'S third-party de-
fense, see J.B. Ruhl, The Third Party Defense to Hazardous Waste Liability: Narrowing the
Contractual Relationship Exception, 29 S. TEX. L. Rv. 291 (1988).
17. Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 964 F.2d at 86-87.
18. Westwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp.,
737 F. Supp. 1272, 1275 (W.D.N.Y. 1990), on reargument 767 F. Supp. 456 (1991),
affd, 964 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992). National Fuel pointed out in its brief that the site
had been used for industrial purposes since 1866. Brief for Appellee at 1, West-
wood Pharmaceuticals v. National Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 964 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.
1992) (No. 91-9157). People's Gas Corporation manufactured gas on the site from
1897 until 1925, when it sold the property to Iroquois. Westwood Pharmaceuticals,
737 F. Supp. at 1275. This is important in that National Fuel maintained that
neither it nor Iroquois disposed of the waste which eventually released hazardous
substances. Brief for Appellee at 10.
19. Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 737 F. Supp. at 1275. Iroquois destroyed a "1.75
million cubic foot gas holder, a one million gallon oil tank, a relief holder, a gas-
purifying house, and at least two tar-separator pits." Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. The contract of sale provided that Westwood could: " '(a) inspect the
Premises upon reasonable notice to the Seller; (b) enter the Premises for purposes
of inspection and planning for Purchaser's occupancy and for the demolition of
buildings and improvements; and (c) commence the demolition of buildings and
improvements situated upon the Premises ... .'" Id. (quoting sales contract).
23. Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 737 F. Supp. at 1275-76 n.2. The parties dis-
puted whether Iroquois knew of Westwood's construction plans for the site. Na-
tional Fuel maintained that Iroquois had no notice of Westwood's plans to
construct facilities at the site. However, as the district court noted, this is unlikely.
Id. at 1276. National Fuel did not dispute that Iroquois had granted Westwood
access to the property prior to closing for the specific purpose of inspecting the
property and commencing destruction of improvements on the premises. Id. at
1275. Furthermore, since Iroquois had represented that the site was safe for West-
[Vol. V: p. 237
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Immediately after settlement, Westwood built a warehouse on
the southern portion of the site.24 Soil borings taken by Westwood
during construction revealed the presence of petroleum-based con-
taminants. 25 Additional soil borings were taken in 1984 and 1985
in connection with Westwood's construction of a second warehouse
on the northern portion of the site. 26 These tests also revealed that
petroleum-based contaminants and other wastes, including under-
ground piping and tar separator pits, were present at the site. 27
Westwood disposed of the waste at its own expense28 and sub-
sequently sought reimbursement from National Fuel under CER-
CLA.29 National Fuel maintained that Westwood proceeded
recklessly in building facilities at the site after discovery of the
wastes.5 0 National Fuel also claimed that it repeatedly warned West-
wood about the "manner and pace" of the construction activity.A1
Predictably, National Fuel asserted the third-party defense, con-
wood's demolition of improvements, Iroquois should have anticipated that West-
wood was demolishing the existing improvements in order to construct its own.
24. Id. at 1276.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 737 F. Supp. at 1276. These facts represent the
basis of National Fuel's argument that Westwood was responsible for the release.
National Fuel argued that because Westwood knew of the potential for contamina-
tion, Westwood should have known to proceed more cautiously during construc-
tion at the site. Id.
28. Id. at 1275-76. Westwood expended over $650,000 investigating and re-
moving the waste. Id. at 1277. National Fuel claimed it spent over $75,000 investi-
gating the contamination at the Westwood site. Id.
29. The legislative history of CERCIA provides only limited evidence of Con-
gressional intent to authorize a private cause of action. However, courts generally
reason that Congress intended the statute to permit private enforcement in order
to further CERCLA's goals of efficient and prompt cleanup of hazardous waste.
See, e.g., McGregor v. Industrial Excess Landfill, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 1401 (N.D. Ohio
1987); see also Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1499-1500 (discussing right of
private right of action under CERCLA). For a legislative history of CERCLA, see
THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, SUPERFUND: A LEGISLATIVE HIsToRy, Vols. 1-3,
(Helen Cohn Needham & Mark Menefee eds., 1982) [hereinafter CERCIA LEGIS.
HIST.].
The right of a private party to bring an action for response costs emerged
early in CERCLA's history. See Bulk Distribution Ctrs., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F.
Supp. 1437, 1444-45 (S.D. Fla. 1984); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co.,
544 F. Supp. 1135, 1140 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Virtually every court deciding the issue
has concluded that CERCLA authorizes a private right of action. E.g., 3550 Stevens
Creek Assoc. v. Barclay's Bank of Cal., 915 F.2d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2014 (1991); Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco Inc., 792 F.2d 887,
891 (9th Cir. 1986); McGregor v. Industrial Excess Landfill, Inc., 709 F. Supp.
1401, 1409-10 (N.D. Ohio 1987), af'd, 856 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1988); Artesian Water
Co. v. New Castle County, 605 F. Supp. 1348, 1356 (D. Del. 1985).
30. Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 737 F. Supp. at 1276.
31. Id.
1994]
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tending that Westwood's actions were the sole cause of the
release.3 2
Westwood filed a motion for summary judgment on its CER-
CLA claim regarding most of National Fuel's affirmative defenses,
including the third-party defense. 33 The Federal District Court for
the Western District of New York denied Westwood's motion for
summary judgment on the third-party defense asserted by National
Fuel.34 That court held that National Fuel had raised a triable issue
of fact on the availability of CERCLA's third-party defense.35 West-
wood moved for reconsideration arguing that the contractual rela-
tionship exception barred National Fuel from asserting the third-
party defense.3 6 The district court reaffirmed its earlier opinion,
but permitted an interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit.3 7
III. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND: THE ORIGINS OF CERCLA AND
THE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION TO THE THIRD-
PARTY DEFENSE
A. CERCLA: Congressional Response to Hazardous Waste
Pollution
In response to the common law's inability to effectively deal
with the nation's growing pollution problems, Congress intervened
with a torrent of federal legislation designed to alleviate the health
hazards associated with pollution.38 The vast majority of this legisla-
32. Id. at 1277. National Fuel also claimed that Westwood failed to investigate
the origin and scope of the contamination. According to National Fuel, Westwood
could have prevented the release by properly conferring with environmental ex-
perts and architects. Id. at 1276.
33. Id. at 1286-87. National Fuel asserted at least twenty-one affirmative de-
fenses. Id. at 1274-75 n.1. The district court granted Westwood's motion for sum-
mary judgment on several of these defenses. For instance, the court barred
National Fuel's defenses which were based upon the unconstitutionality of CER-
CLA, lack of causation, and the use of state-of-the-art methods for disposal. Id. at
1286-87. The district court permitted National Fuel to assert its equitable defenses
at trial. Id. at 1287.
34. Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 737 F. Supp. at 1287.
35. Id.
36. Westwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 767 F.
Supp. 456 (W.D.N.Y. 1991), aftd, 964 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992).
37. See Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 964 F.2d at 88-89.
38. Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1469. During the 1960's and 1970's,
Congress enacted numerous laws to reduce the dangers of pollution in the envi-
ronment. These laws included significant measures designed to ensure air and
water quality. The more noteworthy Congressional efforts in this area include: the
Clean Air Act of 1955, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); the National
Emissions Standards Act of 1967, 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988
& Supp. III 1991). Implicit in Congressional efforts during this time was the ac-
[Vol. V. p. 237
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tion, however, dealt with the quality of air and water resources;3 9 it
was not until enactment of the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act of 1976 (RCRA) 40 that Congress meaningfully4' addressed
the dangers posed by hazardous waste. 42 RCRA regulates current
hazardous waste-related activity, i.e., generation, processing and dis-
posal, from "cradle to grave," but provides no remedy for past re-
leases of hazardous substances.43
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to combat the environmen-
tal and public health hazards posed by releases from hazardous sub-
stances. 44 Under CERCLA, EPA is authorized to take cleanup
action itself and later recover its costs from responsible parties.45
Alternatively, EPA can order a responsible party to take cleanup ac-
tion itself.46
knowledgement that Congress had failed in the past to adequately address the
nation's pollution problems.
39. See supra note 38. Each statute referred to in note 38 supra, protects air
and water quality.
40. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act §§ 3001-5006, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-
6956 (1988) (RCRA). RCRA is incorporated in subchapter III of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act § 1002, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1988).
41. The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (1988),
authorizes EPA to establish guidelines for regulation of hazardous waste. How-
ever, this act was dreadfully ineffective in dealing with the hazardous waste prob-
lem because it focused only upon the effects of pollution on drinking water.
Congress enacted RCRA to fill this void. Amy E. Aydelott, Comment, "CERCLA-
ING" the Issues: Making Sense of Contractual Liability Under CERCLA, 3 Vnxt. ENVrL.
L.J. 347, 351 (1992).
42. See Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1470-71.
43. SeeJ. GORDON ARBUCKLE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 60 (12th
ed. 1993). RCRA establishes a manifest system for tracking environmental waste.
Id. at 60-61.
44. United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 548
(W.D.N.Y. 1988); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573,
576 (D. Md. 1986); see also Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1471 (discussing
impetus for passage of CERCLA).
With CERCLA, Congress endeavored to reduce the danger to human health
and the environment posed by previously dumped hazardous waste (and thus, not
regulated under RCRA). Much of this dumping occurred at sites no longer receiv-
ing hazardous waste. This particular threat became known as the "inactive hazard-
ous waste site problem." H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120 [hereinafter H.R. 1016] (discussing impe-
tus for passage of CERCLA). Love Canal in Buffalo, New York, is the paradigm of
the "inactive waste site" Congress sought to address. Love Canal involved the re-
lease of large amounts of extremely hazardous waste into waterways. Hooker Chemi-
cals, 680 F. Supp. at 548. Aggravating the situation, the property was sold to the
local school district, which constructed a school adjacent to the site. Id. at 549. In
addition, the State of New York built the LaSalle Expressway directly through the
area where the waste was dumped. Id. For further discussion of the history of the
Love Canal disaster, see infra note 120.
45. See CERCLA §§ 104(a), 107(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9607(a).
46. See CERCLA § 106 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
1994]
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The circumstances leading to CERCLA's passage have pro-
foundly influenced hazardous waste regulation since 1980. During
the two years preceding enactment of CERCLA, the Love Canal dis-
aster 47 awoke public concerns about the widespread danger of haz-
ardous waste pollution. 48 Congress endured significant public
pressure to deliver effective hazardous waste litigation before the
96th Congress' recess.49 Consequently, Congress equipped CER-
CLA with an iron enforcement fist,50 but provided little in terms of
legislative history to guide EPA and the courts in implementing the
law.51
47. For a discussion of the details of the Love Canal incident, see infra note
120 and accompanying text.
48. The national media first reported the Love Canal disaster on August 2,
1978. See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Upstate Waste Site May Endanger Lives, N.Y. TIMES,
August 2, 1978, at Al. In addition to generating public awareness of the hazardous
waste problem, the Love Canal incident was instrumental to the congressional haz-
ardous waste initiative. In fact, CERCLA's legislative history refers specifically to
the contamination at the Love Canal site. The very first finding of Congress re-
garding the need for a legislative initiative reads: "Hooker Chemical's three dispo-
sal sites in the Niagara Falls, New York, area contain an estimated 352 million
pounds of industrial chemical waste, including TCP (which is often contaminated
with one of the most toxic substances known to man, dioxin) and lindane, a highly
toxic pesticide product." H.R. 1016, supra note 44, at 6121.
49. See 1 CERCLA LEGIS. Hisr., supra note 29, at xviii-xxi (Summary of Major
Bills - Stafford-Randolph Compromise).
50. See ARBucKLE, supra note 43, at 267. CERCLA defines "hazardous sub-
stance" more broadly than any other hazardous waste statute. See CERCLA
§ 101 (14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (14). The statute's regulation of inactive waste disposal
sites closes the aperture left by RCRA. ARBUCKLE, supra note 43, at 269-74.
51. See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L.
1, 1-2 (1982).
The circumstances attendant to CERCLA's enactment resulted in a vague leg-
islative history. Public concern over the dangers posed by hazardous waste exerted
significant pressure on the Congress to take legislative action. The issue came to a
head when the national elections of November 1980 removed the Democrats from
power in both the Senate and the White House. Unsure of incoming Republicans'
stance on hazardous waste regulation, the 96th Congress hurried to put together a
law prior to the session's recess. 1 CERCLA LEGIs. Hisr., supra note 29, at xxi.
When it became clear that the bills then being debated in the separate cham-
bers would not be passed, Senator Stafford offered amendments that ultimately
evolved into the Stafford-Randolph Compromise. Senator Stafford intended the
amendments to remove the most controversial provisions of the legislation while
preserving those provisions critical to achieving the objectives of the lawmakers.
Id. at xix. This compromise provided that the Senate would approve the compro-
mise legislation in the form of amendments to H.R. 7020. Id. at xxi. Since the bill
contained revenue generating provisions, the language of S. 1480 replaced the
language of H.R. 7020, save the enacting clause, and the bill was returned to the
House for final approval in order to comply with Article I, Section 7 of the United
States Constitution. Id.; Grad, supra, at 29.
When the Senate bill reached the House, it generated considerable contro-
versy. Due to the time constraints on Congress, the House debated the bill under
a "suspension of the Rules," which effectively amounted to a "take it or leave it"
[Vol. V: p. 237
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1. CERCLA Imposes Strict Liability
Faced with pressures to remedy the hazardous waste problem,
Congress intended that CERCLA would impose strict liability52 on
"covered persons. "53 Only the very narrow affirmative defenses
enumerated in section 107(b) of the statute limit this strict liabil-
ity.5 4 That section provides affirmative defenses to covered persons
based on a lack of causation. 55 These defenses shield the defend-
ant when response costs are incurred as a result of an act of God, an
proposition for the Representatives. Grad, supra, at 1, 29-30. Anxious to enact
hazardous waste legislation, and faced with tenuous support in the Senate and the
twilight of the 96th Congress, the House passed the bill. President Carter signed
the bill into law on December 11, 1980. Id. at 35.
The judiciary and commentators alike have derided CERCLA's legislative his-
tory. One court noted: "Even the legislative history must be read with caution
since last minute changes in the bill were inserted with little or no explanation."
United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.N.J. 1983). As Frank Grad
wrote, CERCLA "ha[s] virtually no legislative history at all[.]" Grad, supra, at 2.
52. New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); see 1
CERCILA LEGIS. HisT., supra note 29, at 164 (statement of Rep. James Florio).
While CERCIA does not explicitly impose strict liability on PRPs, this intent is
clear from the legislative history. Id. CERCLA's language and structure mirror
that of § 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("CWA"), which at the
time CERCLA was passed, had been consistently interpreted as imposing strict lia-
bility. Grad, supra note 51, at 15-16. In fact, Representative Florio introduced into
the Congressional Record a letter from the Assistant United States Attorney Gen-
eral, summarizing the caselaw that established strict liability under CWA. 1 CER-
CIA LEGIS. HIsT., supra note 29, at 164. Thus CERCLA's liability scheme
resembles state law versions of strict liability: the burden of proof shifts from the
plaintiff to the defendant. See Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3, at 1544.
53. CERCLA § 107(a) imposes liability on "covered persons," defined as
follows:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for
disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance ....
CERCILA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
54. For a discussion of the defenses available under CERCIA, see infra text
accompanying notes 55-59. For the text of the defenses authorized by CERCLA,
see supra note 6. As previously noted, many courts have interpreted the statute as
obviating all other equitable defenses.
55. See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044; see also Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 3,
at 1544.
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act of war, or an act or omission of a third party other than the
defendant.5 6 The third-party defense protects PRPs from liability if
"an act or omission of a third party"5 7 caused the "release or threat
of release."58 CERCLA restricts availability of the defense, however,
to situations where the acts or omissions did not occur "in connection
with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with
the defendant."59 If a release or threat of release was caused by an
act or omission of a third party in connection with a contract with the
defendant, the third-party defense is unavailable. Thus, the con-
tractual relationship exception significantly limits the third-party
defense. The scope of the contractual relationship exception to the
third-party defense was the issue before the Second Circuit in West-
wood Pharmaceuticals.60
2. Legislative History of the Contractual Relationship Exception
The third-party defense, as originally drafted in H.R. 7020,61
did not contain the contractual relationship exception. Instead,
H.R. 7020 originally conditioned the defense only on the defend-
ant's ability to show that a third party was the sole cause of the dam-
age, and that the defendant exercised due care.62 However, by
providing a defense that required only the demonstration of due
care, H.R. 7020 contravened the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
section 522, which imposes strict liability upon those engaged in
56. CERCLA § 107(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (3).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. 964 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992). For a discussion of the issues before the Sec-
ond Circuit in Westwood Pharmaceuticals, see infra notes 137-49 and accompanying
text.
61. H.R. 7020, entitled the "Hazardous Waste Containment Act" was one of
several bills debated by the 96th Congress in pursuit of hazardous waste legislation.
Grad, supra note 51, at 2. Other bills considered by Congress include H.R. 85 and
S. 1480. Id. H.R. 7020, in name only, ultimately evolved into CERCIA as enacted.
See supra note 51. However, the legislation approved by the Senate in the form of
H.R. 7020 contained the third-party defense set forth in H.IR 7020 as approved by
the House, almost verbatim. See 1 CERCLA LEGIS. His-r., supra note 29, at 164
(comments of Rep. Florio, stating "[t ] hese limited defenses are lifted almost verba-
tim from our earlier passed bill.").
62. 1 CERCIA LEGIs. HIsT., supra note 29, at 224-25 (statement of Rep.
Gore). As originally enacted, § 307(a)(1)(C) of H.tR 7020 would have permitted
the defendant to escape liability if the defendant could show that the damages
were "caused solely by... an act or omission of a third party [and] if the defendant
[could) establish[ ] that he exercised 'due care' with respect to the hazardous waste
concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous waste."
Id.
[V l. V: p. 237
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abnormally dangerous activities. 63 Because of this, Representative
Albert Gore was concerned that if the legislation passed in that
form, the law would remove the strict liability that the common law
imposed on handlers of hazardous waste. 64
To remedy this apparent weakness in the legislation, Gore in-
troduced an amendment that eventually evolved into the contrac-
tual relationship exception.65 Gore's amendment required the
defendant to show that it did not share a contractual relationship
with the responsible third party in order to benefit from the de-
fense.66 The purpose of the amendment was to prevent generators
63. Id. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 522 states:
CONTRIBUTING ACTIONS OF THIRD PERSONS, ANIMALS AND FORCES OF
NATURE
One carrying on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to strict
liability for the resulting harm although it is caused by the
unexpectable
(a) innocent, negligent or reckless conduct of a third person,
or
(b) action of an animal, or
(c) operation of a force of nature.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 522 (1977).
64. Id. at 219. "Under the common law, the defendant could not escape lia-
bility even if he did take every precaution [i.e. exercise due care]. H.R. 7020, then,
effectively destroys a rule that has been in effect for over 100 years (since Rylands
v. Fletcher)." Id. (statement of Rep. Gore in support of his proposed amendment
creating contractual relationship exception) (citation omitted). This assessment
of the common law was not entirely accurate. Ruhl, supra note 16, at 305-06. One
cannot definitively state that all activities conducted by handlers of hazardous
waste would constitute abnormally dangerous activity under the common law.
Gore relied upon only very general secondary authority for this proposition. He
argued based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520, which lists the factors
to be considered in characterizing an activity as abnormally dangerous. See 1 CER-
CLA LEGIS. HIST., supra note 29, at 218-19. Presumably, Gore assumed the courts
would consider the handling of hazardous waste to be an abnormally dangerous
activity. Since the courts could never evaluate each possible circumstance in which
CERCLA would apply, Gore's conclusion that handling hazardous waste would be
classified as abnormally dangerous under the common law, while likely accurate in
most situations, was an oversimplification of the law. See Ruhl, supra note 16, at
305-06. Gore was correct in stating that, if strict liability applied, no third-party
defense would be available under the common law. Id.
65. Grad, supra note 51, at 16-17; see also Ruhl, supra note 16, at 305. Repre-
sentative Gore's original amendment required the defendant to prove that the
third party acted negligently. 1 CERCLA LEGis. HIST., supra note 29, at 227. How-
ever, as this standard was regarded as "unnecessary and overburdensome" on the
defendant, Gore agreed to delete it from his amendment. Id. at 222 (statement of
Rep. Florio).
66. Id. at 218; see also CERCLA § 107(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3). The
Gore amendment was subsequently amended. See supra note 65. However, the
essential nature of the amendment survived and appears in CERCIA as enacted.
For a discussion of the amendment and resulting legislation, see infra notes 67-72
and accompanying text.
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of hazardous waste from avoiding liability simply by contracting it
away. 67
Gore's amendment, however, did not completely eradicate the
third-party defense.68 The amendment incorporated a contractual
relationship exception and a standard of due care for the selection
of contractors. 69 The incorporation of the due care standard into
the defense indicates that Gore intended there to be contractual
relationships that did not automatically preclude defendants from
asserting the third-party defense. 70
67. See 1 CERCLA LEGIs. Hisr., supra note 29, at 220. In explaining the pur-
pose of the amendment, Representative Gore stated:
My amendment moves H.R. 7020 closer to the common law in several
ways. First, the amendment removes the ability of and incentive for a
defendant to contract away liability. The amendment would insure that
the common law rules of both strict and vicarious liability remain intact
in cases in which a defendant seeks to shift the responsibility ... to others
with whom he is involved in a business relationship.
Id.
68. Ruhl, supra note 16, at 306; see 1 CERCLA LEGIS. Hist., supra note 29, at
227. Gore's amendment permitted the third-party defense to survive. The pro-
posed amendment, however, significantly restricted the availability of the defense.
Applying Gore's original amendment to H.R. 7020 as reported out of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, the defenses available under the
legislation would have appeared as follows:
Sxc. 3071. (a) LmILr.- (1) Except for a release or threatened re-
lease, of hazardous waste which the defendant establishes to be caused
solely by-
(A) an act of God or an act of war,
(B) negligence on the part of the Government of the United States,
(C) an act or omission of a third party, other than an employee or
agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in
connection with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indi-
rectly, with the defendant.
(2) For purposes of subparagraph (1) (C), a defendant (including a gen-
erator, transporter, shipper or disposer) must demonstrate that he exer-
cised due care with respect to all foreseeable acts or omissions of any
third party and that he exercised due care in light of all relevant facts and
circumstances, including:
(A) exercised due care in the selection and instruction of a responsi-
ble person engaged by such defendant for the transportation, stor-
age, treatment or disposal of said hazardous waste;
(B) provided adequate information as to the identity, quality, com-
position, condition, characteristics and potential hazard of the waste
to such person;
(C) took reasonable measures to assure and verify that such person
properly carried out the activities for which he was engaged;
(D) properly labeled, loaded and packaged the waste and properly
equipped and maintained the container or facility used for the trans-
portation, storage, treatment or disposal of the waste.
Id. at 227, 230. The above represents the author's combination of Gore's pro-
posed amendments and the original bill as reported from committee.
69. 1 CERCLA LEGIS. Hisr., supra note 29, at 227.
70. See Ruhl, supra note 16, at 306. Ruhl noted that
[Vol. V: p. 237
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As enacted, CERCLA requires a defendant to show that "he
exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance con-
cerned."71 The inclusion of the contractual relationship exception
"supports the position that the exception is limited to situations
where the defendant could exercise or reasonably should have ex-
ercised control over the third party under the contract."72
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
Westwood Pharmaceuticals represents the only significant circuit
court discussion of the contractual relationship exception. Other
circuit courts have faced the issue, but have not addressed the
scope of the exception in detail, 73 choosing instead to rule on the
availability of the defense based on other requirements of the stat-
ute, such as the "sole cause" or "due care" requirement. With the
[i]f Congressman Gore had intended for his amendment to cover all con-
tractual relationships, his retention of the ... due care standard for selec-
tion of contractors would have been in direct conflict with his intent.
Rather, Congressman Gore contemplated the situation of a third party
who is engaged by such a defendant for the transportation, storage, treat-
ment, or disposal of the hazardous waste, and he prescribed the due care
criteria applicable to such contractual relationships .... Therefore, not
all contractual relationships would have been removed from the third
party defense.
Id.
71. See CERCLA § 107(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3). Contrast this reference
with the extensive language of how the law would have appeared with Gore's origi-
nal amendment, set forth at note 68, supra.
72. Ruhl, supra note 16, at 307. This is precisely what National Fuel argued to
the Second Circuit in Westwood Phartmaceuticals, 964 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992). Brief
for Appellee at 19-24. National Fuel pointed to five facts as evidence of its lack of
control over Westwood. First, there was an extended period of time between the
sale of the property and the release. Second, the agreement of sale lacked any
provisions regarding Westwood's post-purchase use of the land. Third, National
Fuel was not informed of Westwood's intentions regarding the property. Fourth,
National Fuel asserts that all of the wastes left on the site were properly sealed.
Fifth, Westwood ignored National Fuel's repeated warnings to investigate the site
and proceed more cautiously. Id. at 23-24.
73. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985);
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988). In both of these
cases, the courts did not directly discuss the contractual relationship exception. In
Shore Realty, the Second Circuit summarily addressed the contractual relationship
exception with a brief comment in a footnote. New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,
759 F.2d 1032, 1048 n.23 (2d Cir. 1985). For a discussion of the Shore Realty deci-
sion, see infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text. The Fourth Circuit in Mon-
santo relied heavily upon the reasoning of the district court decision in that case,
and offered virtually no statutory analysis in support of its holding. See United
States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 173 (4th Cir. 1988). For a discussion of the
Monsanto decision, see infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
13
Meehan: Towards Defining the Contractual Relationship Exception to CERCLA
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
250 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JoURNAL [Vol. V: p. 237
exception of one district court in one case, the district courts have
similarly avoided discussing the issue.74
The cases preceding Westwood Pharmaceuticals that addressed
the contractual relationship exception can be classified into three
general categories. The first category includes early cases in which
the court construed the contractual relationship exception broadly,
thereby limiting the availability of the third-party defense. 75 In later
cases, courts interpreted the exception narrowly, making the de-
fense available in more situations.76 Cases that do not fall into the
previous two categories comprise the third category. This category
includes cases in which the court was not clear in its holding or
hinged its decision on another requirement of the defense. 77
74. The Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York ad-
dressed the scope of the contractual relationship exception in Shapiro v. Alex-
anderson, 741 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.YJuly 9, 1990) on reargument 743 F. Supp. 268
(S.D.N.Y Aug. 24, 1990). For discussion of the relevant caselaw that did not con-
front this issue, see supra notes 79-125 and accompanying text.
75. Cases interpreting the exception broadly include the following: United
States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106
(1989) (precluding third-party defense based on existence of lease agreement be-
tween defendant and third party); United States v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F.
Supp. 742, 748 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (finding that because defendants leased facility
from landowner, their contractual relationship precluded defendants from assert-
ing the third-party defense); United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal,
Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 993 (D.S.C. 1984), aff'd sub nora., United States v. Monsanto
Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989) ("Because
there is no question of the contractual link between the landowners and [the third
party], whose liability is admitted, the landowners cannot under any circumstances
prove that the release was caused 'solely' by a third party which did not share a
contractual relationship with them."); O'Neill v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 728
(D.R.I. 1988) (requiring defendant to show that "'a totally unrelated third party is the
sole cause of the release'" in order to benefit from the defense) (quoting United
States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1987); City of Philadel-
phia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,133, 20,134 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (sug-
gesting limitation of the defense "to situations where the responsible party has no
connection to the third party"); United States v. Argent Corp., 21 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1354, 1356, (D.N.M. 1984) ("Because of this contractual link, defendant...
cannot show... that the release was caused solely by a third party which did not
share a contractual relationship with him.").
76. Cases interpreting the exception narrowly include: Shapiro v. Alexander-
son, 743 F. Supp. 268, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("The Court... does not embrace the
view that the contractual relationship clause encompasses all acts by a third party
with any contractual relationship with a defendant."); United States v. Hooker
Chem. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 558 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) ("[Defendant's] ...
contractual relationships ... preclude the company's assertion of a viable third-
party defense in this case, because.., of the nature of its relationships with these
defendants in this case."); United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F.
Supp. 573, 581 (D. Md. 1986) ("The evidence presented does not clearly demon-
strate the full nature of the contractual and business relations between [the
parties].").
77. The "other cases" include: New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032
(2d Cir. 1985) (implying that any contractual relationship is sufficient to preclude
14
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By the time the Second Circuit addressed the issue, a distin-
guishable trend towards interpreting the contractual relationship
exception narrowly had evolved.78
A. Early Cases: Leaving Defendants Defenseless
Among the early cases interpreting the exception broadly was
United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc. (SCRDI).79
SCRDI involved an action brought by EPA against both the land-
owners and the tenant of the property to recover cleanup costs in-
curred at a hazardous waste site in Columbia, South Carolina.80
The landowner defendants had leased the property to co-defendant
South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc. ("South Carolina Re-
cycling"), which disposed of hazardous waste on the leased prop-
erty.81 When EPA brought the action against the defendant
landowner, the landowners sought the protection of the third-party
defense, claiming that the tenant, South Carolina Recycling, was
solely responsible for the release. 82
third-party defense); Washington v. Time Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529, 532 (W.D.
Wash. 1988) ("There has been an insufficient showing that the release [was] caused
solely by a third party."); United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 626 (D.N.H.
1988) ("The Court found above. . . that there were releases and threatened re-
leases of hazardous substances at the [site] prior to [third party] involvement.
Therefore, [third parties] could not be the sole cause of the releases, and a third-
party defense is unavailable to [defendant]."); United States v. Tyson, 25 Env't.
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1987 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that parties engaged in contractual
relationship of ownership and accounts receivable sales were contractually related
and unable to assert defense).
78. The "distinguishable trend" is evident in the three decisions immediately
preceding the Second Circuit's decision in Westwood Pharmaceuticals. Hooker Chemi-
cals, Shapiro, and the district court decision in Westwood Pharmaceuticals. In each of
these cases, the court adopted the narrow view of the exception. Meanwhile, not a
single court advocated a broad view of the exception in the four years preceding
the Second Circuit's decision.
79. 653 F. Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984), affd sub nom., United States v. Monsanto
Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988) (affirmed with regard to third-party defense;
vacated and remanded on unrelated issues), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989)
[hereinafter SCRD/].
80. Id. at 990-91.
81. Id. at 990. In 1972, defendant-landowners, Hutchinson and Seidenberg,
leased property to Columbia Organic Chemical Co. (COCC), which planned to
use the facility to store raw chemicals and materials used in its manufacturing pro-
cess. In 1973 or 1974, several individuals associated with COCC began storing haz-
ardous waste at the site. These individuals formed South Carolina Recycling &
Disposal, Inc. ("South Carolina Recycling") in 1976, and continued storing wastes
at the site. In 1978, South Carolina Recycling assumed COCC's verbal lease. Dur-
ing that time, South Carolina Recycling stored the chemicals in a dangerous man-
ner, which resulted in fires, explosions, and the release of toxic fumes. Id.
82. Id. at 993.
1994]
15
Meehan: Towards Defining the Contractual Relationship Exception to CERCLA
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
252 VIuANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. V: p. 237
EPA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the availability
of the third-party defense. The Federal District Court for the Dis-
trict of South Carolina granted EPA's motion, thus precluding the
landowners from asserting the third-party defense. Under the stan-
dard set forth by the court, "the landowners [had] to prove inter alia
that 'the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and
the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by ... a third-
party other than.., one whose act or omission occur[ed] in connec-
tion with a contractual relationship ... ,"83 According to the
court, because a contractual relationship existed between the land-
owners and South Carolina Recycling, "the landowners [could not]
under any circumstances prove that the release was caused 'solely'
by a third-party which did not share a contractual relationship with
them [i.e., the landowners]."84 The court assumed that any contrac-
tual relationship between the landowners and the defendant tenant
precluded the third-party defense. 85 This interpretation conflicts
with congressional intent in incorporating the contractual relation-
ship exception into the third-party defense. 86
In 1988, the Fourth Circuit summarily affirmed the SCRDI view
on the scope of the contractual relationship exception. In United
States v. Monsanto Co., 87 the court upheld the SCRDI ruling, adding
little to the district court's analysis.8 8 Significantly, the Fourth Cir-
cuit based its decision in part on the landowners' admission that a
lease existed: "[The landowners] concede they entered into a lease
agreement with [the third party]. They accepted rent from [the
83. SCRDI, 653 F. Supp. at 993 (quoting CERCLA § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(b)(3)) (emphasis added by the court).
84. Id.
85. See id. at 993. The court's decision is conclusory on the scope of the con-
tractual relationship exception. Ruhl, supra note 16, at 302 ("The SCRDI court
engaged in no separate causation analysis and did not consider the parameters of
the contractual relationship with regard to the degree of control involved.").
86. Since Congress clearly intended to permit some contractual relationships
that did not preclude the defense, the court's interpretation conflicts with congres-
sional intent. For a discussion of the legislative history of the third-party defense,
see supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text. The result in this case was not neces-
sarily incorrect; however, the court's analysis failed to adequately consider the
scope of the contractual relationship in coming to this result. Ruhl, supra note 16,
at 302-03.
87. 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989).
88. See id. at 168-69. The Fourth Circuit discusses neither the statute nor the
relationship between the parties. The court merely restates the district court's
findings and presents carefully selected supporting evidence. Compare Monsanto,
858 F.2d at 168-69 with SCRDI, 653 F. Supp. at 993.
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third party] and after [South Carolina Recycling] was incorporated,
they accepted rent from [South Carolina Recycling]."89
The district court in United States v. Argent Corp.90 also inter-
preted the contractual relationship exception broadly. The facts of
Argent Corp. parallel those of SCRDI: a defendant-landowner sought
to invoke the third-party defense, claiming that the tenant-disposers
solely caused the release. 91 Relying upon SCRDI, the court rejected
the defense and granted the government's Motion for Summary
Judgment. 92 The court held that "[b ] ecause of this contractual link,
defendant.., cannot show ... that the release was caused solely by
a third-party which did not share a contractual relationship with
[defendant]."9g In United States v. Northernaire Plating Co.,94 upon es-
sentially similar facts, 95 a district court again declined to examine
the nature of the contractual relationship between the parties and
precluded the defendants from asserting the third-party defense.96
The courts' summary disposition of the issues in these cases embod-
ies the early trend to strictly limit the availability of the third-party
defense.
B. The Emerging Trend: A Narrow Interpretation of the
Contractual Relationship Exception
The first case to suggest that more than the mere existence of
any contractual relationship was required to preclude the third-
party defense was New York v. Shore Realty Corp.97 On July 14, 1983,
89. Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 169. The Fourth Circuit also based its decision in
part on the landowners' failure to exercise due care. Id. The Fourth Circuit's brief
discussion of the lease agreement and rent payments arguably evidences the
court's consideration of the nature of the parties' contractual relationship. In
light of the court's failure to indicate that the contractual relationship exception
hinged upon the nature of the contract, a more plausible explanation is that the
court cited the lease and rent payments as evidence that a contractual relationship
existed and not as a discussion of the nature of the relationship.
90. 21 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1354 (D.N.M. 1984).
91. See id. at 1356.
92. Id.
93. Id. The Argent Corp. court used language virtually identical to that used by
the court in SCRDI. See supra text accompanying note 83.
94. 670 F. Supp. 742 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
95. See id. at 744. Defendant Northernaire operated a metal electroplating
business in Cadillac, Michigan, on property owned by and leased from co-defend-
ant R.W. Meyer, Inc. Id. Meyer argued it was entitled to advance the third-party
defense because Northernaire, its tenant and a third party, was responsible for the
release. Id. at 748.
96. Id. "Northernaire leased the facility from [the landowner]. This contrac-
tual relationship precludes either of these defendants from invoking the protec-
tions of Section 9607(b) (3) . . . ." Id.
97. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
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the defendant, Shore Realty, entered into a contract to purchase a
tract of land near Hempstead Harbor. 98 The contract provided
that Shore could void the agreement after conducting an environ-
mental study.99 After Shore conducted a study which revealed sig-
nificant soil contamination, Shore applied to the New York State
Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) for a waiver
from liability and was denied. 100 Notwithstanding the DEC's denial
of the waiver, Shore assumed title to the property on October 13,
1983.101 During the two months Shore owned the property, the
tenants stored additional wastes at the site.' 0 2 ByJanuary 3, 1984, it
became apparent that the waste was leaking from the storage
equipment.103
The Second Circuit denied Shore the third-party defense
based on Shore Realty's ownership of the property during the pe-
riod of disposal.10 4 In a footnote, however, the court stated:
"[w] hile we need not reach the issue, Shore appears to have a con-
tractual relationship with the previous owners that also blocks the
defense. The purchase agreement includes a provision by which
Shore assumed at least some of the environmental liability of the
previous owners." 05 It is significant that the court did not rely
upon the mere existence of a contractual relationship to preclude
the defense. Rather, in the second sentence of the footnote, the
98. Id. at 1038.
99.. Id.
100. Id. at 1039.
101. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1039.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1048. In this assertion, the Second Circuit was unclear. The court
reasoned as follows:
Shore argues that it had nothing to do with the transportation of the
hazardous substances and that it has exercised due care since taking con-
trol of the site. Who the "third part(ies)" Shore claims were responsible
is difficult to fathom. It is doubtful that a prior owner could be such,
especially the prior owner here, since the acts or omissions referred to in
the statute are doubtless those occurring during the ownership or opera-
tion of the defendant.
Id.
It is not unreasonable to argue that the tenants on the property were responsi-
ble for the release or threat of release of hazardous waste. This approach was
taken in SCRDI, Argen, and Northernaire Plating Co. The court was more likely pro-
posing that the defendant could not satisfy the "sole cause" or "due care" require-
ments because it permitted disposal of wastes, from which there was a release, after
taking title to the property.
105. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1048 n.23.
[Vol. V. p. 237
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Second Circuit implied that the nature of the contractual relation-
ship, not its mere existence, precluded the third-party defense. 10 6
United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co. 10 7 was the first case
to hold1°8 that the contractual relationship exception did not pre-
clude all parties with any contractual relationship with a third-party
from asserting the defense. In that case, Maryland Bank & Trust
("MB&T") had assumed title to property contaminated by hazard-
ous waste. 10 9 EPA removed the waste from the site and sought re-
imbursement from MB&T under CERCLA section 107 (a) (1), as the
current owner of the property."10 In addition to contesting its sta-
tus as an "owner and operator" under CERCLA,11 MB&T raised
the third-party defense, arguing that the prior owners were solely
responsible for the release. 112 In support of a Motion for Summary
Judgment, EPA argued that the bank could not maintain the third-
party defense because a contractual relationship existed between
MB&T and the parties MB&T sought to hold responsible."13 This
relationship consisted of several loans to prior owners of the prop-
erty for business purposes, and a loan to the most recent owner for
which the property was mortgaged." 4 The court denied EPA's Mo-
106. See Ruhl, supra note 16, at 303. The court did not reject the defense
because of the existence of the purchase agreement between the parties. Rather,
the court focused on the terms of the agreement and the agreement's relationship
to the hazardous waste. The Second Circuit's subsequent interpretation of the
contractual relationship exception in Westwood Pharmaceuticals, the subject of this
Note, supports this view of the Shore Realty court's language.
107. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
108. Shore Realty predates United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., dis-
cussed infra notes 107-17 and accompanying text. However, as the Shore Realty
court limited its discussion of the contractual relationship exception to a footnote,
the author does not regard Shore Realty as the first case to recognize, in its holding,
the distinction intended by Congress. For a discussion of the courts' interpreta-
tion of the legislative history to the contractual relationship exception, see supra
notes 61-72, 97-106.
109. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 575.
110. Id. at 575-76.
111. Id. at 577-80. MB&T argued that its status as a lender protecting its se-
curity interest entitled the bank to the security interest exemption under CERCLA
§ 101(20) (A). Id.; see CERCLA § 101(20) (A), 42 U.S.C. 9601(20)(A).
112. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 576.
113. Id. at 581.
114. Id. at 575. During the 1970's, Maryland Bank & Trust (MB&T) made
several loans to Herschel McLeod, the former owner of the property at the center
of the controversy, for use in his trash and garbage business. The property on
which the release occurred, secured at least one of these loans. Id. During 1972 or
1973, McLeod permitted the dumping of hazardous waste on the property. In
1980, Mark McLeod (son of Herschel) borrowed $335,000 from MB&T to
purchase the property from his father. Mark McLeod soon failed to make pay-
ments on the loan and MB&T took title to the property through a foreclosure sale.
Id.
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tion for Summary Judgment, holding that material issues of fact ex-
isted concerning the nature of the relationship between MB&T and
the prior owners of the property.1 5 The court based its decision on
the lack of any evidence showing that there were outstanding loans
in 1972 and 1973, the period of the disposal.'1 6 The court indi-
cated that the availability of the defense hinged on the nature of the
contractual relationship, and not its mere existence."17
United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp.l18 followed the
rationale set forth in Shore Realty and Maryland Bank & Trust. The
Hooker Chemicals litigation stemmed from the Love Canal disaster in
Buffalo, New York.' 19 This case involved an action by both the fed-
eral government and the State of New York against the former
owner of Love Canal to recover response costs incurred as a result
of the former owner's dumping of hazardous waste.120 The defend-
ant, who was the disposer and former owner of the property, sought
the protection of the third-party defense, maintaining that actions
taken by the subsequent owners of the property were the sole cause
of the release.' 2 '
The district court granted the plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on the CERCLA claim, denying the defendant
115. Id. at 581.
116. Mayland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. at 581.
117. Id. "[T] he evidence presented does not clearly demonstrate the full na-
ture of the contractual and business relations between McLeod [(the third party)]
and MB&T." Id. The court also pointed out that the loans, while secured by the
property, were not necessarily used for business purposes. Id. at 581 n.9.
118. 680 F. Supp. 546 (W.D.N.Y. 1988). The Second Circuit and district
courts of New York were the first courts to give a narrow construction to the con-
tractual relationship exception. Judge Curtin of the United States District Court
for the Western District of New York authored both the Hooker Chemicals and West-
wood Pharmaceuticals decisions. Shore Realy was also decided in the Second Circuit.
119. Hooker Chemicals, 680 F. Supp. at 548.
120. Id. at 548-52. Love Canal was originally designed to be a power canal
bypassing Niagara Falls. When this project was abandoned, a dead-end canal along
the Lawrence River remained. In the 1940's, Occidental Chemical Corporation
(OCC) arranged with the Niagara Power and Development Company for the use
of this property for waste disposal. Id. at 549. Eventually, OCC purchased the
property. During the period from 1942 until approximately 1953, OCC dumped
wastes in the canal. Id. In 1953, OCC deeded the property to the Board of Educa-
tion of Niagara Falls, New York, who built a school adjacent to the canal. Id. at
549, 552. The Board of Education subsequently deeded a portion of the property
to the City of Niagara Falls, which installed sewers and conduits through the site.
Id. at 552. In 1968, the State of New York constructed the LaSalle Expressway
directly through the waste site. Id. OCC argued that these last three parties, the
Board of Education, the City of Niagara Falls, and the State of New York, were
responsible for the response costs incurred at Love Canal. Id. at 549, 552.
121. Id.
[Vol. V. p. 237
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use of the third-party defense. 122 Judge Curtin based his decision
on the nature of the contractual relationship between the defend-
ants and the allegedly responsible third parties. 123 The court con-
cluded that the contractual relationship between the parties
precluded the defense because the "[defendant] was able to control
the acts of the [ ] subsequent purchasers because of the nature of its
relationship with the[ ] defendants in this case." 124
The Hooker Chemicals holding is significant because it recog-
nized that the mere existence of the contractual relationship is not
sufficient to preclude the defense. Further, it introduces a new
concept into the contractual relationship exception analysis: a de-
fendant's control over the third party.125 The district court's asser-
tion that control was a necessary element in the relationship
between the defendant and the allegedly responsible third party
marked a significant step in defining the nature of the relationship
necessary to preclude the third-party defense.
Shapiro v. Alexanderson is the most recent case, exclusive of West-
wood Pharmaceuticals, to address the boundaries of the contractual
relationship exception.' 26 In Shapiro, a landowner sought to re-
cover response costs from Putnam County, New York. 127 Defend-
ant, Putnam County, agreed to purchase land from the plaintiffs,
and the parties executed an agreement of sale to that effect. 128 The
122. Id. at 559.
123. Hooker Chemicals, 680 F. Supp. at 559.
124. Id. The court did not explain exactly how the defendant, OCC, could
exert significant control over the third parties that OCC alleged were responsible
for the contamination. See id.
125. Id. at 551. The Second Circuit's analysis contains the first reference to
"control" in the relevant caselaw. The reference likely descends from the govern-
ment's argument. The United States argued that Congress intended to preclude
the defense through the contractual relationship exception when control was exer-
cised by the defendant. Hooker Chemicals, 680 F. Supp. at 551. According to the
United States, " '[b] ecause the generator has a contract with the disposer, the gen-
erator is in a position to control the disposer's behavior with respect to the genera-
tor's waste.' " Id. at 551. (quoting brief for United States) (emphasis appeared in
brief).
One commentator has called for a revision of the statute which would require
control as an element of the relationship necessary to preclude use of the third-
party defense. See Ruhl, supra note 16, at 312. Regardless, the element of control
does not descend from an analysis of legislative history of the contractual relation-
ship exception. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
126. Shapiro v. Alexanderson, 741 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1990) [here-
inafter Shapiro 1], on reargument, 743 F. Supp. 268 (August 24, 1990) [hereinafter
Shapiro I1].
127. Shapiro 1, 741 F. Supp. at 472. The opinion on reargument did not re-
state the facts of the case. Accordingly, the relevant facts were gleaned from the
district court's original opinion.
128. Id. at 474.
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agreement permitted the county to dispose of hazardous waste at
the site during the executory period.129 Although Putnam County
used the property as a solid waste disposal site (pursuant to the con-
tract), the sale transaction never occurred, leaving Shapiro with
legal title to the property at all times.130 Shapiro incurred response
costs resulting from leaching of the waste that the county had de-
posited at the site and sought reimbursement from the County.' 3 '
In a cross Motion for Summary Judgment, the County ad-
vanced the third-party defense, claiming that Shapiro was responsi-
ble for the release of hazardous substances into the environment.13 2
The district court found that questions of material fact existed con-
cerning the cause of the leachate problems.133 On appeal, Shapiro
argued that the questions of fact were irrelevant because the con-
tractual relationship between Shapiro and Putnam County pre-
cluded the County's use of the defense. 34 The court permitted the
defense:
The Court... does not embrace the view that the contrac-
tual relationship clause encompasses all acts by third par-
ties with any contractual relationship with a defendant.
Such a construction would render the language "in con-
nection with" mere surplusage. The act or omission must
129. Id. The executory period is the period commencing with the execution
of the sale agreement and ending with the settlement transaction.
130. Id. The contract of sale provided the county with the right to immedi-
ately begin operating a landfill. The County later resolved to rescind the contract
due to misbehavior of a County official in connection with the sale. The state
court of New York voided the contract. Shapiro II, 743 F. Supp. at 271 n. 1.
131. Shapiro 1, 741 F. Supp. at 474.
132. Shapiro II, 743 F. Supp. at 269-70. The County argued that Shapiro
caused the release after Putnam County surrendered possession to Shapiro. Sha-
piro 1, 741 F. Supp. at 478. According to the County, Shapiro constructed a berm
on the property, which if maintained properly, would have prevented leaching of
wastes into the water supply. Id. The County argued that the owner's negligent
maintenance of the berm caused the release. Id. Shapiro contended that the
berm never existed, and even if it had, it would not have prevented leaching. Id.
133. Shapiro I, 741 F. Supp. at 478.
134. Shapiro II, 743 F. Supp. at 270. In its original opinion, the district court
precluded a third party from asserting the defense because of its contractual rela-
tionship with the defendant, Putnam County. Shapiro I, 741 F. Supp. at 478. The
county advanced the third-party defense claiming the acts of the landfill's opera-
tor, Steven A. Estrin, Inc., were the sole cause of the release and that the County
had exercised due care in the selection of the operator. Id. The court summarily
rejected that defense based on the existence of the contractual relationship. Id.
On reargument, Shapiro sought preclusion of the defense as it applied to its acts
on the same "contractual relationship" theory. Shapiro II, 743 F. Supp. at 270.
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occur in a context so that there is a connection between
the acts and the contractual relationship.13 5
The court concluded that "the contractual relationship had dis-
solved and therefore the alleged omissions of the owners were not
in connection with the contract."13 6 This analysis is significant be-
cause it represents the first judicial analysis of the statutory lan-
guage of the contractual relationship exception. Further, the
Shapiro court was the first court to expressly reject a broad construc-
tion of the contractual relationship exception.
IV. WESTWOOD PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. V. NATIONAL FUEL GAS
DISTRIBUTION CORP.
Against this background, the Second Circuit considered the
scope of the contractual relationship exception to CERCLA's third-
party defense. 137 Westwood had sought to preclude National Fuel
from asserting the third-party defense based on the contractual re-
lationship Westwood had formed with National Fuel in connection
with the sale of the property. 3 8 The Second Circuit held that in
order for the contractual relationship exception to bar the third-
party defense: (1) the phrase "in connection with a contractual rela-
tionship" under CERCLA section 107(b) (3), required more than
the mere existence of any contractual relationship between the
owner of land from which there had been a release of hazardous
substances, and a third party whose act or omission was the sole
cause of the release; and (2) the contract must either relate to the
hazardous substance, or permit the landowner to exert control over
the third party such that the release could have been prevented by
the landowner's exercise of due care.'3 9
135. Shapiro II, 743 F. Supp. at 271.
136. Id. at 272.
137. The Second Circuit relied heavily upon the district court's reasoning. See
Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 964 F.2d at 89. In large part, the Second Circuit simply
adopts the rationale of the district court by reference. Consequently, this Note in
certain instances, will impute the district court's reasoning to the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit's brief restatement and adoption of the district court's reason-
ing warrants such an approach.
138. Id. at 86.
139. Id. at 91-92. The Second Circuit made a third holding on a distinct, but
related issue. The court held that in defining "contractual relationship," CERCLA
§ 101 (35) (C) "does not entirely preclude previous landowners from invoking the
third-party defense." Id. Westwood argued that this section should preclude all pre-
vious landowners from asserting the defense. Brief on behalf of Appellant at 31.
CERCLA § 101 (35) (C) provides:
Nothing in this paragraph or in section 9607(b) (3) of this title shall di-
minish the liability of any previous owner or operator of such facility who
1994]
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A. The Second Circuit's Reasoning
The court based its decision principally upon a statutory inter-
pretation of section 107(b) (3).140 The court stated that the con-
tractual relationship exception should be construed to give effect to
each and every word of the statute; to do otherwise would violate
well accepted principles of statutory construction. 14 1 The construc-
tion urged upon the court by Westwood, however, would effectively
render the "in connection with" language of the section meaning-
less and, therefore, the court rejected that construction. 142 To sup-
would otherwise be liable under this chapter. Notwithstanding this para-
graph, if the defendant obtained actual knowledge of the release ...
when the defendant owned the real property and then subsequently
transferred ownership of the property... without disclosing such knowl-
edge .... no defense under section 9607(b) (3) of this title shall be avail-
able to such defendant.
CERCLA § 101 (35) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(C). The holding of the Second Cir-
cuit responded to Westwood's argument that CERCLA's definition of "contractual
relationship," as amended by Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) [hereinafter SARA], pre-
cluded National Fuel from asserting the third-party defense. See Brief on behalf of
Appellant Westwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc. at 31-37.
The Second Circuit rejected this argument for three reasons. First, the court
reasoned that Congress knew how to place the defense out of the reach of a cer-
tain class of persons, as demonstrated by the second sentence of § 101 (35) (C).
Thus, if Congress wanted to do so for all previous landowners, it would have. West-
wood Pharmaceuticals, 964 F.2d at 90. Second, the Second Circuit doubted that
Congress would bury a significant change in the scope of the third-party defense in
the definition section of the statute. Id. Third, the first sentence of the section
provides an exception to the "in connection with" language for the innocent land-
owner. Id. Thus, this language was irrelevant because National Fuel was not assert-
ing the innocent landowner defense. Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 767 F. Supp. at 461.
For more extensive discussion of the innocent landowner defense, see L. Jager
Smith, Jr., Note, CERCLA's Innocent Landowner Defense: Oasis or Mirage?, 18 COLUM.
J. Etv-rL. L. 155 (1993); Daniel M. Steinway, The Innocent Landowner Defense: An
Emerging Doctrine, 4 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 486 (Sept. 27, 1989); Richard H. Mayes,
The Blessed State of Innocence: The Innocent Landowner Defense Under Superfund, 20
Env't Rep. (BNA) 809 (Sept. 8, 1989).
140. See Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 964 F.2d at 89.
141. Id. "'[E]ffect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sen-
tence of a statute ... so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant.'" Westwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Distribution
Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1272, 1275 (W.D.N.Y. 1990), on reargument 767 F.Supp. 456
(W.D.N.Y. 1991), aftd, 964 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting National Ass'n of Re-
cycling Indus., Inc. v. Interstate Comm. Comm'n, 660 F.2d 795, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(citations omitted)).
142. See Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 964 F.2d at 89. Westwood argued that the
phrase "in connection with" could retain utility under the broad interpretation of
the contractual relationship exception in situations involving contracts other than
real estate transfers. Brief for Appellant at 27, Westwood Pharmaceuticals v. Na-
tional Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 964 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992) (No. 91-9157) [hereinaf-
ter Appellant's Brief]. According to Westwood, "the phrase retains vitality as a
qualifier to other kinds of contracts that section 107(a) liable parties might have,
including transporters or generators, or even owners with respect to contracts
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port its interpretation of the statute, the Second Circuit relied on
Shapiro for the premise that the mere existence of a contractual re-
lationship was not sufficient to preclude the third-party defense. 143
The court also relied on Hooker Chemicals, in which the district
court precluded the defendant's assertion of the third-party de-
fense.1 44 The appellant, Westwood Pharmaceuticals, had argued
that Hooker Chemicals was factually identical to the situation before
the court,145 and, therefore, because the district court in Hooker
Chemicals barred the defendant from asserting the third-party de-
fense, to rule otherwise in this case would be inconsistent with
Hooker Chemicals.1 46
Although the Second Circuit never discussed the factual simi-
larities of the two cases, 147 it emphasized the Hooker Chemicals
court's finding that the contractual relationship permitted the de-
fendant to exert control over the third parties in that particular
case.'48 The district court found that Westwood had failed to show
that its contractual relationship with National Fuel sufficiently re-
sembled the relationship between the parties in Hooker Chemicals;,
therefore, National Fuel was entitled to assert the third-party de-
other than the sale or purchase of real estate." Id. The Second Circuit did not
address this contention. See Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 964 F.2d at 89-92.
143. Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 964 F.2d at 89. In its brief, Westwood distin-
guished Shapiro on two grounds. First, Westwood asserted that Shapiro represented
a unique set of facts. Appellants claimed that since the contract had been for a
limited period of time, there was temporal disconnection between the parties. Ap-
pellant's Brief, supra note 141, at 18-20. Second, Westwood submitted that the
district court's interpretation of the case was erroneous. Id. Because the Shapiro
court held that a party could and could not assert the defense, the only appropri-
ate interpretation of the case is that the case should be heard as claims for equita-
ble contribution. Id. This argument, however, seems borne of desperation to
distinguish adverse authority. The appellant's argument depends on the court's
failure to find that the harm was divisible between the harm caused during the
contract term, and the harm caused after the contract was terminated. See id. at 19
n.9. Since Shapiro involved summary judgment motions, the case's procedural pos-
ture precluded a finding of divisibility of the harm.
144. Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 964 F.2d at 89.
145. Indeed, the cases are factually similar. Both cases involve a former land-
owner seeking the protection of the third-party defense by ascribing responsibility
for a release to the purchaser and subsequent owner. Both subsequent owners
allegedly caused the release through reckless construction activity. Both defend-
ants alleged that the wastes disposed at the sites were properly contained. For a
discussion of the facts of Westwood Pharmaceuticals, see supra notes 18-37; for a dis-
cussion of the facts of Hooker Chemicals, see supra note 120 and accompanying text.
146. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 141, at 16-18.
147. See id. at 88-90.
148. Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 964 F.2d at 89
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fense at trial. 149  By its silence, the Second Circuit implicitly
adopted this district court finding.
B. A Critical Analysis of Westwood Pharmaceuticals
The Second Circuit's analysis of the contractual relationship
exception was brief and cursory. Although the court analyzed the
statute and relevant caselaw, 150 it failed to provide an organized
framework for addressing the issue. Furthermore, the analysis the
court did provide was inadequate in several critical areas.
1. The Second Circuit Failed to Establish an Organized Framework
for its Statutory Analysis.
The Second Circuit's discussion of the contractual relationship
exception failed to establish an organized framework for addressing
the issue. The court should have clearly and explicitly engaged in a
two step analysis.15' First, the court was required to determine the
scope of the exception, independent of the facts before it.' 52 Sec-
ond, the court should have evaluated whether the particular con-
tractual relationship between the parties fell within the scope of the
exception defined in its initial inquiry.'53 The court's analysis was
149. Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 737 F. Supp. at 1286. It is difficult to under-
stand how Westwood could have demonstrated a similarity between the contractual
relationship in Hooker Chemicals and the instant case. The district court in Hooker
Chemicals did not identify how the relationship between OCC (the original genera-
tor and disposer) and the subsequent purchasers of the property permitted OCC
to exert control. See supra note 124. If anything, the available facts indicate that
the "control" situation was similar to that of the Westwood-National Fuel relation-
ship. Defendants in both cases communicated concerns to the third parties whom
they claimed were solely responsible for the release. In both cases, the third par-
ties failed to heed the warnings of the defendants. While the court was correct in
stating that the Hooker Chemicals court made a finding particular to that case, the
situation in the instant case warranted further analysis of the similarities between
the contractual relationships.
150. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's analysis, see supra notes 137-49
and accompanying text.
151. The Shapiro court performed two separate analyses: an evaluation of the
scope of the contractual relationship and a separate analysis of the nature of the
relationship between the parties. Id.; see also Hooker Chemicals, 680 F. Supp. 546, 558
(W.D.N.Y. 1988).
The Hooker Chemicals court engaged also in a two-step analysis. The Hooker
Chemicals court grounded its decision in the defendant's ability to control the ac-
tions of the third parties which defendants sought to blame for the release. Id.
This assumes the court had concluded that the contractual relationship exception
did not swallow the entire defense.
152. The court adequately performed this step. See Westwood Pharmaceuticals,
964 F.2d at 86-89.
153. See Shapiro II, 743 F. Supp. at 270-72; see also Ruhl, supra note 16, at 311-
12. Ruhl's recommendation that the statute requires a certain element of control
supports the two-step approach which the Second Circuit should have applied. See
[Vol. V: p. 237
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inadequate because the court failed to discuss the particular con-
tractual relationship between Westwood Pharmaceuticals and Na-
tional Fuel.' 54
The particular facts of the contractual relationship between
Westwood and National Fuel were critical to fair resolution of the
case, especially in light of the Hooker Chemicals decision, which, iron-
ically, the court cited favorably in its opinion. 155 The facts in Hooker
Chemicals were sufficiently similar to those in Westwood Pharmaceuti-
cals to warrant a discussion of which facts led the court to distin-
guish between the two cases.' 56 By failing to do so, the courts, both
circuit and district, overlooked an important opportunity to clarify
the scope of the contractual relationship exception. 157
2. The Second Circuit's Inadequate Discussion of Authority
The Second Circuit's analysis was shallow and conclusory in
several critical areas. Notably, the court neglected to provide a
thorough discussion of the legislative history, which is critical to a
complete analysis of the scope of the exception.' 58 As discussed
id. at 312. The two-step approach involves, first, a determination that the statute
requires control, and second, an evaluation of the control element within the par-
ticular contractual relationship.
154. See Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 964 F.2d at 89. The court concluded that
the contractual relationship exception to the third-party defense did not include
all contractual relationships, and, therefore, it did not necessarily include the con-
tractual relationship between Westwood and National Fuel. While this may be a
proper decision in response to a Motion for Summary Judgment, it is inconsistent
with Hooker Chemicals. Given the factual simularities between the two cases, some
comment by the court was warranted, even if only expressing its deference to the
district court's finding. For a discussion of Hooker Chemicals, see supra notes 118-25
and accompanying text.
155. See Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 964 F.2d at 89. The Second Circuit agreed
with the district court that the defendant is precluded from asserting the defense if
a third-party is somehow related to the handling of the hazardous waste or if the
contract afforded the defendant a substantial amount of control over the third
party. Id. There is no evidence that the Second Circuit reviewed the district court's
determination that the instant contractual relationship did not furnish the defend-
ant a significant amount of control. See id.
156. The Second Circuit made no attempt to distinguish Hooker Chemicals.
Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 964 F.2d at 89. The Court apparently relied on the dis-
trict court's finding that "Westwood ha[d] not shown that its contractual relation-
ship with National Fuel sufficiently approximated [that] between [defendant] and
the subsequent purchasers in that case so as to entitle Westwood to a similar pre-
trial ruling..." Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 737 F. Supp. at 1286.
157. While a factual determination by the Second Circuit was impossible
given the procedural posture of the appeal, some discussion of the defendant's
(non-moving party's) factual claims was required of either the Second Circuit or
the district court.
158. See Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 964 F.2d at 89. For a discussion of the legis-
lative history of the § 107(b) (3) defense, see supra notes 61-72 and accompanying
text.
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previously, a strong argument can be made from CERCLA's legisla-
tive history to support the Second Circuit's literal interpretation of
the third-party defense; reference to this legislative history would
have reinforced the court's position.
Moreover, the court's discussion of existing caselaw was also
inadequate. The Second Circuit limited its discussion of the
caselaw to two cases, Hooker Chemicals and Shapiro.159 The court
overlooked most of the existing authority on the issue before it.' 6°
A review of this authority would have further clarified the extent of
control necessary to preclude the defense.16' Considering the disa-
greement among courts and the judicial inertia towards determin-
ing which contractual relationships preclude the defense, the court
could have clarified the law had it considered all available authority
for its decision.
V. A SYNTHESIS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION INCLUDING
WESTWOOD PHARMACEUTICALS
The Second Circuit concluded that the contractual relation-
ship exception does not bar the defense in all contractual relation-
ships. This decision will likely stand; 162 the statutory analysis makes
sense and comports with the provision's legislative history.' 63 How-
ever, the question of which contractual relationships should bar the
third-party defense remains.
Certain factors are clearly relevant to the determination. First,
a relationship must exist between the third party whose "act or
omission" caused the release, and the defendant; this much seems
clear from the statute. 164 Second, as Maryland Bank & Trust and
Shapiro indicate, a temporal and substantive relationship must exist
between the contract and the dumping that causes the release or
threat of release; in other words, the "act or omission" must occur
159. For a discussion of the court's analysis, see supra notes 140-49 and accom-
panying text.
160. For a complete discussion of the caselaw, see supra notes 73-136 and ac-
companying text.
161. The opinion did not specify the elements of control that were necessary
to preclude the defense, despite the opportunity and need. See infra 164-167
notes and accompanying text for a discussion of the omissions of the court in
setting forth these requirements.
162. The trend in the caselaw has been moving away from the view that any
contractual relationship will bar the defense. See supra note 73. See generaly Ruhl,
supra note 16.
163. For a discussion of the legislative history of the third-party defense, see
supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
164. See CERCLA § 107(b) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (3).
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"in connection with" the contract. 165 Finally, there is authority that
requires an element of control between the third-party and the de-
fendant in order to bar the defense; Hooker Chemicals and Westwood
Pharmaceuticals both stand for this proposition. 166 The Second Cir-
cuit held only that "some" control may be necessary to preclude the
defense. 67 The extent of control necessary to bar the defense re-
mains unanswered.
VI. THE EFFEcr OF Westwood Pharmaceuticals ON Fu-rup.
CERCLA LITIGATION
Westwood Pharmaceuticals solidifies the numerous district court
decisions holding that the contractual relationship exception to the
third-party defense does not bar the defense due to the mere exist-
ence of a contractual relationship. The decision also legitimizes the
view that control may be a necessary element of the contractual re-
lationship for the exception to apply. Combined with the previ-
ously established requirements of temporal and substantive
relation, the control requirement established in Westwood
Pharmaceuticals further defines the contractual relationship that pre-
cludes the third-party defense. Although CERCLA is scheduled for
reauthorization during the current Congress, it is unlikely that Con-
gress will clarify the contractual relationship exception, given the
emerging agreement among the courts. The precise boundaries of
the contractual relationship exception will evolve only with addi-
tional and more exhaustive judicial direction. 6
The Westwood Pharmaceuticals decision will please environmen-
tal defense attorneys. It resurrects CERCLA's only real defense by
relegating the contractual relationship exception to what it was in-
165. See supra notes 107-17, 126-36 and accompanying text.
166. The court in Hooker Chemicals barred the defense because the nature of
the contractual relationship was such that the defendant could control the actions
of the third party. Hooker Chemicals, 680 F. Supp. 546, 558 (W.D.N.Y. 1988). The
Second Circuit ruled similarly: "The [defendant would be precluded from asserting
the defense] if the contract allows the [defendant] to exert some control over the
third party's actions. .. ." Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 964 F.2d at 89.
167. Westwood Pharmaceuticals, 964 F.2d at 89.
168. Since CERCLA's enactment in 1980, Congress has declined to correct or
guide judicial interpretation of the contractual relationship exception to the third-
party defense. SARA, passed in 1986, included an additional definition of "con-
tractual relationship," that became the "innocent landowner defense," but did not
clarify the "in connection with" language. Now that the courts have given effect to
clear congressional intent, it is unlikely that Congress will amend the statute
merely to define more clearly the nature of the contractual relationship necessary
to preclude the defense.
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tended to be: an exception. The Northernaire, SCRDI, Monsanto, and
Argent Corp. courts allowed the exception to swallow the rule.' 69
Westwood Pharmaceuticals places an additional burden on plain-
tiffs seeking summary judgment regarding the third-party defense.
After Westwood Pharmaceuticals, a plaintiff seeking summary judg-
ment must show not only that a contractual relationship existed be-
tween the defendant and the third party, but also that the contract
either related to the hazardous waste or permitted the defendant to
significantly control the activity of the third party.170 Ultimately,
this decision shifts the forum for the presentation of the defense.
Instead of being a matter of law before the court, the availability of
the defense will more frequently be decided by a jury.
Michael A. Meehan
169. For a discussion of the early caselaw, see supra notes 79-96 and accompa-
nying text. The courts' view of the contractual relationship exception demon-
strated by these cases virtually eliminates the defense. It is difficult to conceive of a
situation in which a defendant could assign responsibility for a release to a party
with which it did not share a contractual relationship. Under this view of the de-
fense, the third party would have to be a complete stranger to the defendant. The
defense would thereby retain little practical vitality as few defendants would know
the identity of the responsible party.
170. See text accompanying supra note 139.
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